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Going beyond default intensities in an EU carbon border adjustment mechanism 
 





As part of its Green Deal, the European Union is currently preparing a “Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism” (CBAM). A CBAM applies carbon pricing to imports with 
the objective of mitigating concerns about carbon leakage. To reduce complexity, it is 
likely the EU will rely on “default” values in determining the carbon intensity of 
imports to which its CBAM will apply. In this paper, we suggest that a CBAM based 
solely on default intensities runs counter to the economic logic of carbon pricing by 
distorting the incentives for emissions abatement. Instead we propose a CBAM design 
with a voluntary “individual adjustment mechanism” (IAM) that allows producers to 
demonstrate that their actual carbon intensity lies below the default value. We argue 
that the use of an IAM captures additional economic benefits of carbon pricing— 
notably providing more efficient abatement incentives—and improves the overall 
legal prospects of a CBAM being found to comply with international law and WTO 
rules. We discuss practical considerations around the implementation of an IAM, and 
illustrate with a short case study on the steel sector. 
 
Keywords: Border carbon adjustment, carbon pricing, Green Deal, international law, 
international trade 
JEL codes: H23 (environmental taxes), K33 (international law), Q54 (climate change) 
 
1. Introduction  
As part of its European Green Deal and the vision of climate-neutrality, the European 
Union (EU) is currently preparing the design and implementation of a “Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism” (CBAM), more generically also referred to as a “border 
carbon adjustment” (BCA). The CBAM is meant to extend the geographic reach of the 
EU’s carbon price by applying it to products imported from non-EU countries. Such 
products could include electricity and fuels, basic industrial materials like steel, 
aluminium and cement, or more complex semi-manufactured and manufactured 
goods.3 Applying a CBAM can ensure that the price of imports more accurately reflects 
                                               
1 MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) (mmehling@mit.edu) 
2 Energy Policy Research Group, Judge Business School, Cambridge University (r.ritz@jbs.cam.ac.uk) 
We are grateful to Evgeniya Pomerlyan and Nikita Vorobyev for helpful discussions, and to an internal 
EPRG reviewer for valuable comments. Michael Mehling thanks NLMK for supporting this research. 
All views expressed and any errors are those of the authors. 
3 For the purposes of the proposal presented in this paper, the exact product coverage of the CBAM is 
not decisive, but in Section 4.4 below we include a case study that assumes steel imports are covered. 
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their carbon content, and thereby helps mitigate long-standing concerns about carbon 
leakage (the relocation of emissions from the EU to non-EU countries without a 
reduction in overall emissions). For a combination of technical, administrative, and 
legal reasons discussed in this paper, it is likely that the EU will rely on “default” 
values when determining the carbon intensity of imports, instead of determining 
carbon intensity individually at product level.4  
In this paper, we argue that a CBAM based solely on such default values comes with 
economic and legal drawbacks, and that a CBAM design based on an “individual 
adjustment mechanism” (IAM) offers a superior policy option for the EU. An IAM 
allows application of the CBAM based on a product’s actual carbon intensity, thus 
taking into account the producer’s decarbonization efforts. Furthermore, making the 
IAM voluntary allows it to be used alongside a default intensity, but gives companies 
exporting to the EU the option to demonstrate that their actual carbon intensity lies 
below the default value. This sidesteps several obstacles under international law that 
would arise from making the disclosure of individual carbon intensities mandatory 
within the CBAM. 
A CBAM based solely on a default intensity is a “one size fits all” policy that runs 
somewhat counter to the economic logic underlying the use of carbon pricing to 
combat climate change. It has two main economic drawbacks. First, relatively clean 
producers get overcharged compared with high-carbon rivals. Second, it provides no 
incentives for abatement; the only way for a non-EU producer to reduce its carbon 
costs is to reduce its sales to the EU. Taken together, this means that key benefits of 
carbon pricing are lost—in a way that distorts abatement incentives and favours less 
climate-efficient foreign producers. This also has legal ramifications: first, because 
domestic producers have to report their actual emissions, the use of default intensities 
for imported goods treats domestic and foreign products differently, and therefore 
risks being perceived as discriminatory. Moreover, by sacrificing the incentivising 
effect of carbon pricing, a default intensity is less likely to be considered justified on 
environmental grounds. Both factors increase the risk of a violation of international 
trade law. 
We argue that our proposal of a voluntary IAM brings significant economic and legal 
benefits relative to a default CBAM design—and is practically implementable building 
on existing architecture for emissions verification in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS). The IAM (partially) addresses the economic drawbacks identified: relatively 
clean producers are now no longer disadvantaged, and efficient abatement incentives 
are at least partially restored in that reductions in actual carbon intensities can pay off. 
The inclusion of an IAM also lowers the burden of information on the EU regarding 
the carbon intensities of foreign producers, and improves the prospects that a CBAM 
will be found in alignment with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. An IAM can 
help ensure greater symmetry in the treatment of domestic and foreign goods by 
allowing foreign producers to undergo the same process of measurement, verification 
and reporting (MRV) of emissions that domestic producers face under the EU ETS. 
                                               
4 Such a default value can have different levels of stringency, ranging from “best in class” to “worst in 
class” for a particular product. This includes a notional average carbon intensity of all imports into the 
EU or a particular intensity decile; an example of the latter is the best 10% percentile that currently 
provides the benchmark for free allowance allocation to trade-exposed sectors in the EU ETS. 
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Past case law, specifically the affirmation by a GATT panel of a border tax adjustment 
by the United States on imports related to feedstock chemicals, supports our legal 
assessment. 
The paper discusses economic, legal and practical considerations around a voluntary 
IAM. Section 2 sets out a simple economic framework to understand the potential 
advantages of an IAM over the sole use of default intensities. It also discusses concerns 
about “resource shuffling” as well as accommodating continued free allocation to EITE 
sectors and carbon pricing outside the EU in CBAM design. Section 3 discusses legal 
aspects with a focus on how an IAM can improve legal feasibility of a CBAM in terms 
of WTO law. Section 4 addresses practical considerations around the implementation 
of an IAM, including emissions verification and a short case on the steel industry. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Economic considerations 
2.1 CBAMs and principles of carbon pricing 
From an economic perspective, the ideal policy is a uniform global carbon price that 
covers all countries and sectors. Following the logic of Pigou (1920) and Montgomery 
(1972), this price should be set at the social cost of carbon (SCC).5 Such a policy 
provides the correct incentives to internalize the climate externality, in line with the 
“polluter pays” principle. Stern & Stiglitz (2017) estimate that the dynamic trajectory 
of a target-consistent global carbon price that is in line with the ambition of the Paris 
Agreement rises up to $50–100/tCO2 by 2030.6 As a market-based measure, its core 
appeal lies in achieving emissions abatement in a globally cost-effective manner. The 
use of carbon pricing is gradually spreading across jurisdictions (World Bank 2020) 
but still falls well short of an efficient global policy benchmark.  
The EU is now seeking to extend the geographic reach of its carbon price signal by 
introducing a CBAM that applies to imports into the EU. Its idea is summarized as 
follows: “Carbon leakage occurs when production is transferred from the EU to other 
countries with lower ambition for emission reduction, or when EU products are 
replaced by more carbon-intensive imports... a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
would ensure that the price of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content” 
(European Commission 2020a). In short, a CBAM can level the playing field in carbon 
costs between domestic production and imports, and therefore mitigate the risk of 
carbon leakage. For a combination of technical, administrative, and legal reasons, it 
looks likely that the EU may rely on “default” values when determining the carbon 
intensity of imports at the product level which apply uniformly regardless of the 
country of origin.7 
The use of a CBAM based on default carbon-intensities runs somewhat counter to the 
economic logic of carbon pricing.8 This logic revolves around the carbon price 
                                               
5 Rubin (1996) extends this logic to dynamic emissions trading in an intertemporal context. 
6 Stern & Stiglitz (2017) emphasize that complementary policies would be in place alongside carbon 
pricing; without these, the required carbon-price trajectory may be significantly higher. 
7 We further discuss different choices of the default intensity in Section 4.2. 
8 Arguably it also runs counter to the market-based spirit of the EU ETS which the European 
Commission has regularly defended since its inception in 2005.  
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providing incentives that lead to the marginal cost of abatement being equalized across 
producers—therefore minimizing the overall cost of emissions abatement. A crucial 
feature is that polluters pay the carbon price according to their actual carbon intensity. 
Instead, relying on a default intensity becomes more akin to a “one size fits all” policy 
which inevitably raises the overall abatement cost (Newell & Stavins 2003). In practice, 
carbon intensities can vary widely even within industrial sectors (Lyubich, Shapiro & 
Walker 2018), so market-based flexibility becomes key to cost-effective 
decarbonization. So, in principle, there is a good economic case for trying to go beyond 
the use of default intensities in a border carbon adjustment.  
2.2 A framework for understanding CBAM design options 
It will be helpful to use a simple economic framework to understand different CBAM 
design options. Suppose that the EU’s carbon price is given by t (measured in €/tCO2) 
within the EU ETS. Consider a product i that is produced by a company j based in a 
country k outside the EU and suppose that its actual carbon intensity (i.e., emissions 
per unit of output) is given by zijk. Suppose, for now, that this company faces a zero (or 
very low) domestic carbon price and that the introduction of a CBAM leads to the 
discontinuation of free allowance allocation to EU-based companies. 
A CBAM based solely on a default intensity treats each non-EU9 firm in the sector that 
sells product i as having carbon intensity Zi, regardless of its identity j and location k. 
So the default CBAM involves a carbon cost of t x Zi being applied at the border to 
each unit of imported product from company j. This framework illustrates how a 
default CBAM comes with two economic drawbacks. First, there is a static inefficiency: 
any firm that is cleaner than the default intensity (zijk < Zi) gets overcharged relative to 
its actual carbon intensity (and relative to rivals with above-default intensities); this 
runs counter to the cost-effectiveness property of carbon pricing. Second, there is a 
dynamic inefficiency: given that the CBAM is based on a default intensity beyond its 
control, the only way for a firm to reduce its carbon costs is to reduce its sales to the 
EU; put differently, there is no incentive to engage in abatement that reduces its carbon 
intensity. Taken together, this means that key benefits of carbon pricing are lost—in a 
way that favours high-carbon companies. 
Following the economic logic of carbon pricing, the ideal way to correct these static 
and dynamic drawbacks would be for the CBAM to instead be based on firms’ actual 
carbon intensities. This would yield a per-unit carbon cost of t x zijk being applied at 
the border so the resulting carbon price faced by company j is identical to that if it were 
instead located within the EU. Hence this would restore cost-effectiveness and other 
desirable properties of carbon pricing. However, as noted in the introduction (and 
explained further in Section 3.3 below), this type of mandatory product-by-product 
CBAM is likely to be infeasible from a legal perspective. 
This leads us to the idea, supported by the legal analysis in the next section, of 
designing a CBAM with a voluntary individual adjustment mechanism (IAM). This 
design retains a default intensity but gives the option to companies exporting to the 
EU to demonstrate that their actual carbon intensity lies below the default value. This 
                                               
9 Our exposition here assumes that the liable party under the CBAM will be the foreign exporter; if, 
however, EU-based importers were designated the liable party, similar arguments would still apply. 
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yields a carbon  cost of t  x min{zijk,Zi} at the border, reflecting that company j can 
choose the lower of its actual and the default intensity. This voluntary IAM partially 
addresses the two economic drawbacks identified: (1) relatively clean producers are 
now no longer disadvantaged, and (2) efficient abatement incentives are partially 
restored in that reductions in actual carbon intensities can pay off. So, while this design 
still falls short of a Pigouvian ideal, it can be a significant improvement on the default 
CBAM design; Figure 1 illustrates. The additional complexity of an IAM comes with 
increased implementation costs, which we discuss further in the following sections; at 
the same time, however, a voluntary IAM helps shift the informational burden 
concerning carbon performance from the regulator to the firms themselves. The 
remainder of this section discusses other concerns and design features of an IAM as 
part of CBAM design. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of default CBAM and individual adjustment mechanism 
2.3 Resource shuffling and carbon leakage 
Resource shuffling (or “reshuffling”) has been an important concern for California’s 
border carbon adjustment on electricity imports from other US states. The California 
Air Resources Board defines reshuffling as “any plan, scheme, or artifice to receive 
credit based on emissions reductions that have not occurred, involving the delivery of 
electricity to the California grid” (CARB 2011). For example, a Californian utility that 
previously imported coal-fired power might, in response to a border carbon price seek 
to replace this contract with gas-fired power—with the coal-fired power instead being 
sold in another state. California’s regulation has nominally prohibited such 
reshuffling—but this has in practice been difficult to enforce (Fowlie & Cullenward 
2018; Pauer 2018). Resource shuffling is essentially a form of gaming the system: 
holding fixed existing trade flows, production from cleaner installations that would 
have otherwise gone to a third jurisdiction is used to contractually substitute for dirtier 
production so as to reduce exposure to the border adjustment, with zero effect on 
overall emissions. With a CBAM based solely on a default carbon intensity, there is no 










There are important differences between the Californian experience and an EU CBAM 
that applies to EITE industrials. California’s border adjustment is a sub-national policy 
that has in-state companies pay a border carbon price on imported electricity; the EU’s 
CBAM would instead have foreign companies pay a border carbon price on exports to 
the EU. These differences have implications in terms of the potential for resource 
shuffling. First, reshuffling concerns are perhaps most acute for electricity markets due 
to the large heterogeneity in carbon intensities between generation technologies 
combined with the flexibility of trading arrangements in wholesale power markets. By 
contrast, industrial sectors have different contractual arrangements between buyers 
and sellers and may also have less variation in carbon intensities. Second, while 
Californian electricity importers might reshuffle contracts “intra-market” by switching 
from a dirty to a cleaner supplier, industrial companies exporting to the EU and liable 
to pay the CBAM could reshuffle contracts only “intra-company” from dirty to cleaner 
installations under the same corporate ownership (provided these can make the same 
EU-bound product). Taken together, these points suggest that concerns about 
reshuffling may be significantly less pronounced under an IAM for industrial sectors 
than they have been for California’s border adjustment on electricity imports. We 
return to the question of how policy can further mitigate resource shuffling in our 
discussion in Section 4.3 of practical considerations around the implementation of an 
IAM. 
At the same time, the introduction of a CBAM is likely to also have market-based 
impacts in form of carbon leakage that are distinct from resource shuffling. To see the 
logic, consider a producer that exports to the EU and to the rest of the world. Suppose 
that all of its production has the same carbon intensity so that there is no motive for 
resource shuffling. An EU CBAM will, all else equal, make domestic sales in its own 
country as well as exports to the rest of the world look relatively more (cost-) attractive. 
Hence the market-based impact of the CBAM may be lower sales to the EU but higher 
sales to 3rd countries—which can be seen as a form of carbon leakage. This is distinct 
from reshuffling: it is not driven by contractual gaming of existing trade flows but 
rather by profit-maximization across multiple export markets. Such market-based 
third-country leakage effects would be likely both under a default CBAM and an IAM. 
Since relatively clean exports experience a lower cost increase with an IAM than under 
the default CBAM, this may help mitigate this type of leakage.10 
2.4 Other CBAM design features 
To complete our economic analysis, we now incorporate two other features of CBAM 
design: the continued presence of free allocation within the EU and carbon pricing 
outside the EU. Both apply to CBAM design in general, and are not specific to an IAM. 
Free allocation to EITE sectors. The above analysis assumes that the introduction of a 
CBAM leads to free allocation to EITE sectors being discontinued. In practice, this 
process may be phased such that free allocation co-exists with a CBAM over a 
                                               
10 Comparing market-based leakage effects under a default CBAM with those under an IAM would 
require an economic model of multimarket competition, and the answer may hinge on the finer details 
of the competitive environment.  
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transition period.11 This would necessitate adjustments to our formulae for carbon-
price equalization. A simplified application to the EU ETS goes as follows. Suppose 
that yi* is the carbon intensity of the best 10% percentile EU producer in an EITE sector. 
Under current allocation rules, this company receives just enough free allocation to 
cover its compliance obligation; EU producers with a higher carbon intensity are left 
with a (post-allocation) compliance gap. Consider, again for product i, an EU producer 
j with a carbon intensity of yij > yi*, receiving free allocation covering a fraction fij = 
yi*/yij ∈	(0,1) of its emissions (per unit of output). Therefore, we can conceptualize an 
average degree of free allocation fi	=	average(fij)	∈	(0,1) across EU companies selling 
product i, with an average carbon intensity yi	=	average(yij).	 This leads to an allocation-
adjusted carbon cost under the IAM of t  x max{0, min{zijk,Zi} – fi x yi}, reflecting the 
watering down of the EU carbon price for EITE sectors from its headline level t.12 To 
illustrate, a non-EU producer cleaner than the default intensity, zijk < Zi, would face an 
IAM carbon cost of t  x [zijk – fi x yi], unless its actual intensity is so low in that zijk < fi x 
yi, in which case its carbon cost is zero. For another example, suppose that the CBAM’s 
default intensity were set at the average EU carbon intensity and that the non-EU 
producer is less clean, Zi = yi < zijk; the formula for the carbon cost simplifies to t x Zi(1 
– fi), reflecting the ‘dilution’ of the EU carbon price due to free allocation. 
Carbon pricing outside the EU. The above analysis assumes that the country outside the 
EU has a zero carbon price. While this assumption is currently applicable in a wide 
range of cases, carbon pricing has been picking up in the rest of the world. Suppose 
instead that producer j’s product i faces a domestic carbon price tijk  in its country k so 
that ∆tijk = max{t–tijk,0}, is the shortfall in its carbon price relative to the EU. This 
adjusted carbon-price differential could then be used for the CBAM. For example, 
under an IAM, the “top up” carbon price at the border would become ∆tijk  x 
min{zijk,Zi}, and therefore vary by country of import.13 From an economic viewpoint, 
this top-up feature has the attractive property of ensuring carbon-price equalization 
over time by adjusting to enhanced carbon pricing in non-EU countries—thus 
providing an incentive for other countries to adopt a carbon price. 
The above adjustment is in terms of “explicit” carbon prices that are determined within 
a cap-and-trade system like the EU ETS or by a carbon tax. It does not attempt to 
incorporate “effective” carbon prices due to non-price policies that implicitly place a 
price on carbon; this includes taxes on road fuels, renewable support schemes, fossil 
fuel subsidies, and compensation schemes for indirect carbon costs due to increased 
power prices. The plethora of such policies makes estimating effective carbon prices 
very challenging, and there is currently no standard methodology. Moreover, any such 
                                               
11 A related point is that a CBAM will likely apply only to imports and therefore cannot level the playing 
field in terms of the carbon competitiveness of EU exports to foreign markets, which creates a rationale 
for the continued use of free allocation for exports (Evans, Mehling, Ritz & Sammon 2020). 
12 A caveat is that this simple calculation adjusts the carbon price purely based on accounting of free 
allocation, without incorporating the impact on economic incentives (e.g., on a firm’s marginal cost of 
production). Current EU allocation rules are a complex hybrid with elements of grandfathering, output-
based allocation and an emissions performance standard (due to benchmarking); working out its impact 
on economic incentives would require more detailed analysis.  
13 A producer based in a country with a carbon price above the EU level would then be exempt from 
CBAM-related payments (and its country could apply a CBAM on its imports from the EU). 
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estimates of effective carbon prices would also vary by EU Member State, creating 
additional complexity in the calculation of a border carbon adjustment.14 
Finally, we can extend the formula to account for both carbon pricing outside the EU 
and free allocation within the EU ETS. This leads to a carbon cost under the IAM of 
∆tijk x max{0, min{zijk,Zi} – fi x yi}. For simplicity, this assumes that the carbon price in 
the non-EU country itself is either a carbon tax or an auctioned ETS, i.e., it does not 
have any free allowance allocation. In general, the appropriate adjustment of a CBAM 
for carbon pricing outside the EU would need to take into account the specific design 
of free allocation (and potentially of other support policies). 
Section 3: Legal considerations 
3.1 International trade law 
While the introduction of a CBAM raises legal questions in more areas than one, 
international trade law is particularly relevant because of how the measure will be 
applied to goods traded across national borders. From the earliest announcement of 
the CBAM in Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines to various subsequent 
statements and documents, the European Commission and its President have 
consistently emphasised the need to ensure that it be “fully compliant with World 
Trade Organization rules” (von der Leyen 2019; similarly European Commission 
2019a; European Commission 2020a). As will be shown in this section, the inclusion of 
an IAM improves the prospects that a CBAM will be found in alignment with World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
At the heart of the WTO regime lies the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which dates back to 1947 and is a legally binding international treaty with 
broad membership. According to its preamble, the GATT aims at a “substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade” and at “the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” A central tenet of the GATT – 
and a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system – is the principle of non-
discrimination in international trade. For trade in goods, it consists of two elements: 
the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment obligation, set out in Article I of the GATT, 
and the national treatment (NT) obligation, set out in Article III of the GATT.  
Article I:1 of the GATT prohibits parties from discriminating between “like” products 
originating in, or destined for, any other party, whereas Article III of the GATT 
prohibits discrimination between domestic products and “like” imported products. 
What constitutes “likeness” of domestic and imported products is not defined in the 
GATT, but has been determined in relevant case law based on whether they share 
                                               
14 Because the CBAM, as currently discussed, will only adjust for the explicit carbon price paid by EU 
producers under the EU ETS—and not other climate-related policies, such as energy taxes—it can also 
be argued that such non-price policies do not need to be taken into account to ensure symmetry between 
EU and foreign producers (unless perhaps the foreign jurisdiction relies solely on non-price policies to 
curb emissions from the same activities as those covered by the EU ETS, but this would raise significant 
methodological and likely also political – e.g. lobbying – challenges).   
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common physical characteristics and properties, end uses, and tariff classifications; 
whether they compete in the marketplace; and relevant consumer preferences.15  
Importantly, differences in the processes and production methods (PPMs) that do not 
leave a physical trace in the final product – such as the source of energy used during 
production – are not generally considered to affect the likeness of products.16 Although 
the jurisprudence on “like” products remains inconclusive and has seen some 
evolution in recent case law,17 there is a high probability that goods produced with 
low-carbon PPMs and carbon-intensive goods would be considered “like” products, 
despite their different carbon footprints. Any differentiation between such products 
that leads to a competitive disadvantage could thus be considered discriminatory 
(Pauwelyn 2013). 
Under international trade law, treating domestic and imported goods differently 
based on the carbon intensity of their production therefore incurs a risk of judicial 
challenge (Mehling et al. 2019). A CBAM that imposes a greater compliance burden on 
carbon-intensive imports than that faced by less carbon-intensive domestic products, 
for instance, could be considered discriminatory. Because such differentiation on the 
basis of (actual or assumed) carbon intensity is intrinsic to the notion of a CBAM, 
however, and because – as shown in the preceding section – differentiation is critical 
to its environmental effectiveness, it is difficult to envision how the EU can altogether 
avoid risking a violation of the principle of non-discrimination set out in the GATT.  
For the same reason, the literature on border carbon adjustments has routinely 
highlighted the importance of Article XX of the GATT, which can provisionally justify 
measures that would otherwise be considered discriminatory (Condon & Ignaciuk, 
2013). Two such general exceptions relate to measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health” (Article XX(b)) or “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” (Article XX(g)). Both the 
wording of these provisions and their broad interpretation in past case law suggest 
that measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions can fall under either 
exception (UNEP & WTO 2009).  
Several conditions need to be met for Article XX(b) and (g) to be successfully invoked, 
however, including two that have a bearing on the legal implications of an IAM: the 
need for a sufficient connection between the CBAM and its environmental objective, 
which is inferred from the wording “necessary to” and “relating to”; and a 
requirement that the measure not be applied in a manner which would constitute “a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail”, which is derived from the introductory paragraph – or “chapeau” 
– of Article XX. 
                                               
15 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, 20-21; Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 99. 
16 Going back to, notably, Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, DS21/R, 
3 September 1991, unadopted. 
17 See, for instance, Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale 




When applied to the concept of an IAM, the foregoing considerations imply the 
following two takeaways: first, an IAM can help ensure greater symmetry in the 
treatment of domestic and foreign goods by allowing foreign producers to undergo 
the same process of measurement, verification and reporting (MRV) that domestic 
producers face under the EU ETS. It is safe to assume that only foreign producers who 
are less carbon-intensive than the default intensity applied by the EU will avail 
themselves of the voluntary IAM, whereas those who are more carbon-intensive will 
be treated as if they were as carbon-efficient as the default intensity. All else being 
equal, this would mean that foreign goods will be treated as or more favourably than 
domestic goods with the same carbon intensity, lowering the likelihood that the CBAM 
violates Article III of the GATT.  
Second, if products with different carbon intensities are considered “like” products 
despite their different carbon footprints, the CBAM still risks being considered 
discriminatory because relatively less carbon-intensive EU products will in some cases 
face a lower compliance burden than relatively more carbon-intensive foreign 
products. In that case, the admissibility of the CBAM depends on whether it can be 
provisionally justified by one or more of the general exceptions under Article XX of 
the GATT. As mentioned earlier, Article XX(b) and (g) are the exceptions of greatest 
relevance in this context, and both require a sufficient connection between the measure 
and its environmental objective. The previous section already highlighted how an IAM 
improves the environmental effectiveness of the CBAM by providing a stronger 
incentive for foreign producers to reduce their carbon intensity. Additionally, by 
ensuring greater symmetry in the treatment of domestic and foreign products, the IAM 
also helps meet the requirements of the “chapeau” of Article XX.  
Past case law supports this assessment: in the United States – Superfund case, a GATT 
panel affirmed a border tax adjustment imposed by the United States under the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) on certain imported 
substances produced from feedstock chemicals subject to a domestic excise tax.18 
Importers were required to furnish the information necessary to determine the amount 
of feedstock chemicals and thus of tax to be imposed, but if they failed to do so, the 
United States was authorized to apply a default – or baseline – rate equal to the 
predominant method of production in the United States. According to the panel, this 
approach was sufficient to demonstrate equivalence under Article III of the GATT 
between the domestic excise tax and the border measure applied to imports.19  
In a more recent case, United States – Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body 
conversely held that a rule under the Clean Air Act regulating the composition and 
emission effects of gasoline to prevent air pollution was discriminatory by setting out 
different calculation methods for domestic and foreign gasoline.20 In particular, the 
                                               
18 Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 – 34S/136, 
adopted 17 June 1987. In assessing whether this border adjustment complied with the national treatment 
obligation, the panel cited Article III of the GATT, stating that it ‘permits the imposition of an internal 
tax on imported products provided the like domestic products are taxed, directly or indirectly, at the 
same or a higher rate’, see ibid., para. 5.2.7. 
19 Ibid., para. 5.2.9. 
20 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996. 
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Appellate Body objected to the fact that importers were subject to a default “statutory 
baseline” that had no connection to the particular gasoline imported, while refiners of 
domestic gasoline were assessed against an individual baseline representing the 
quality of gasoline produced by each refiner. This, so the Appellate Body, constituted 
an “unjustifiable discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” 
in the context of Article XX(g) of the GATT.21 It also rejected practical arguments that 
verification on foreign soil, and subsequent enforcement actions, would be so difficult 
as to rule out individual baselines. Here, the Appellate Body pointed to the possibility 
of relying on documentary evidence provided by the foreign refiners themselves – 
citing, inter alia, the option of third-party verification – and also highlighted the 
importance of cooperation on such administrative arrangements.22 
Box 1: Mechanisms for individual adjustment in the United States 
In the two cases cited above, the United States applied – or explored the introduction of – variations 
of an IAM. In the first case, the inclusion of an individual adjustment component was part of a 
border tax adjustment for imported substances produced from chemicals subject to an excise tax 
domestically. It was introduced through an amendment of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) by 
way of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, which reauthorized 
the so-called “Superfund” program designed to investigate and clean up sites contaminated with 
hazardous substances. §4671 of the IRC sets out the border tax adjustment by imposing “a tax on 
any taxable substance sold or used by the importer thereof.” §4671(b)(1) goes on to state that the 
amount of the tax imposed “shall be the amount of the tax which would have been imposed … on 
the taxable chemicals used as materials in the manufacture or production of such substance if such 
taxable chemicals had been sold in the United States for use in the manufacture or production of 
such taxable substance.” §4671(b)(2) specifies a penalty rate for imported substances in cases where 
“the importer does not furnish to the Secretary [of the Treasury] (at such time and in such manner 
as the Secretary shall prescribe) sufficient information to determine under paragraph (1) the 
amount of the tax imposed.” This rate, set at “5 percent of the appraised value of such substance 
as of the time such substance was entered into the United States for consumption, use, or 
warehousing”, was deemed discriminatory by the panel in the US – Superfund case. According to 
the panel, however, the subsequent provision allowed for a non-discriminatory approach to the 
challenge of insufficient information. §4671(b)(3) authorizes the Secretary to “prescribe for each 
taxable substance a tax which, if prescribed, shall apply in lieu of the tax specified in paragraph (2) 
with respect to such substance” and “shall be equal to the amount of tax which would be imposed 
by subsection (a) with respect to the taxable substance if such substance were produced using the 
predominant method of production of such substance.” 
In the second case, concerning a section of the Clean Air Act on reformulated gasoline introduced 
in 1990, the challenge revolved around a section on “anti-dumping rules” and delegated 
regulations that treated imported gasoline differently from domestic gasoline by denying it the 
opportunity to establish an individual baseline. A stated above, the Appellate Body held this 
approach to constitute “unjustifiable discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international 
trade.” In its reasoning, the Appellate Body affirmingly cites a rulemaking process which the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated in 1994, but subsequently abandoned. It would 
have added a new §80.84 to Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, creating the 
                                               
21 Ibid., 29. 
22 An exception could only apply for cases where “the source of imported gasoline could not be 
determined or a baseline could not be established because of an absence of data”, see ibid., 27. 
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option of individual baselines for foreign refineries.23 To initiate the process, foreign refiners would 
have been able to submit a petition to the EPA including data verified by an auditor, who in turn 
had to be a U.S. citizen. Such petition should contain a signed declaration attesting the 
completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the petition, and committing to grant 
“any EPA inspector or auditor immediate and complete access” to relevant premises, regardless of 
whether such inspections are announced or unannounced. Gasoline from such refiners could not 
be combined with gasoline from any other sources prior to its entry into the U.S., and each 
shipment of gasoline would have to be accompanied by an analysis of batch samples at various 
stages of shipment by an independent, U.S.-based laboratory. Finally, a U.S.-based certified public 
accountant would have to annually perform an “attest engagement” to determine the accuracy of 
gasoline inventory reconciliation and other relevant data.  
To conclude, thus, the analysis of relevant legal provisions and case law suggests that 
an IAM improves the prospects of the CBAM being found in compliance with WTO 
rules, and thereby helps it align with the stated intention of the European Commission 
mentioned at the outset of this section. 
3.2 International environmental law 
Under the Paris Agreement, an international climate treaty adopted in 2015 with 
nearly universal participation, parties agreed that the pace and ambition of domestic 
climate efforts is to be decided at the national level. According to Article 4(2) of the 
Paris Agreement, it is up to each party to “prepare, communicate and maintain 
successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve”; Article 4(3) 
goes on to state that successive contributions should reflect each party’s “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.” 
A CBAM could be held to contravene this fundamental principle if it were considered 
a unilateral measure that coerces other countries to increase their domestic climate 
efforts in order to avoid or limit compliance obligations for products entering the EU. 
Whether the Paris Agreement, whose overarching objective is to “strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change” (Article 2(1)), can be interpreted to limit 
unilateral action if such action – like the CBAM – is primarily aimed at increasing 
climate ambition, is debatable; be that as it may, an IAM would arguably alleviate such 
concerns because, relative to a default intensity, it affords foreign producers greater 
flexibility. The ability to demonstrate actual carbon intensities of foreign products 
may, in turn, reduce pressure on the respective countries to change existing or adopt 
new policies mandating lower carbon intensities across the board in order to satisfy 
the relevant EU default threshold. 
3.3 General international law  
Finally, by seeking to influence policy choices in foreign jurisdictions and basing its 
calculation on physical processes taking place on foreign territory, a CBAM could be 
considered an extraterritorial measure that infringes on the territorial sovereignty of 
affected trade partners. Territorial sovereignty comprises the right of states to exercise 
                                               
23 Environmental Protection Agency, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 
Individual Foreign Refinery Baseline Requirements for Reformulated Gasoline, Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 
84, 3 May 1994, 22800-22814. 
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state authority within their territory, and manifests itself in the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states.24 Unilateral measures that take into 
account circumstances within foreign territory risk being considered a violation of that 
principle and of the domaine réservé of affected states. 
In a case involving the inclusion of international aviation in the EU ETS, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a climate policy measure covering foreign entities and 
based on activities occurring, at least in part, over foreign territory “did not infringe 
the principle of territoriality” because the entities were physically located within the 
EU when the measure was applied.25 Although a similar reasoning could be applied 
to the CBAM because it will only be applied once imports enter the territory of an EU 
Member State, the ECJ decision was by no means free of controversy (Hartmann 2013). 
More generally, coercive action taken by one state to secure a change in the policies of 
another is likely to constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the latter 
(Jamnejad & Wood 2009), underscoring the risk associated with any mandatory 
policies. 
A voluntary IAM can mitigate any residual risk under general international law and 
the principle of territoriality. It obviates the need for the EU to collect emissions and 
production data from foreign entities, or to mandate the disclosure of such data. Aside 
from being difficult to enforce in foreign territory, such mandatory requirements 
would be more likely to face challenge as an intervention in the internal affairs of 
affected states. Instead, the combination of a default intensity with a voluntary IAM 
ensures that any consideration of activities on foreign territory, and any related action 
taken by foreign entities, occur on a purely voluntary basis. Consequently, the IAM 
lowers the risk of the CBAM being considered a violation of the sovereignty of affected 
trade partners.  
4. Practical considerations 
4.1 Formal considerations 
When thinking about the practical implementation of an IAM, the language found in 
U.S. legislation and rulemaking proposals (see above, Box 1) as well as a Non-Paper 
introduced into the European policy discussion in 2016  by the French government to 
stimulate consideration of a border adjustment for the EU ETS (France 2016) provide 
useful reference. All of these contain elements relevant to an IAM. Additionally, the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI Committee) of 
the European Parliament proposed legislative language related to a border carbon 
adjustment in 2016 which, although ultimately not adopted, includes consideration of 
the relevant legal process (European Parliament 2016). 
As a design feature of the CBAM, an IAM would most likely be operationalised as part 
of the same process introducing the CBAM. While it remains unclear at this point what 
                                               
24 Deriving it from the principle of sovereign equality of states enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Charter 
of the United Nations: International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 202. 
25 European Court of Justice (ECJ), Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. 




type of policy instrument the European Commission will propose to implement the 
CBAM,26 the political and economic gravity of this measure suggests that all options 
will necessitate formal legislation, as set out in Articles 289 et sqq. of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In its amendment proposals, for instance, 
the ENVI Committee sought inclusion of a provision in the EU ETS Directive27 to enact 
the border carbon adjustment, and would have authorized the Commission to adopt 
delegated acts “specifying the exact design of the detailed requirements for this 
scheme” (European Parliament, 2016).  
In the following analysis, we assume that legislative implementation of the CBAM will 
follow the approach envisioned by the ENVI Committee. In other words, we assume 
that the carbon price which the CBAM seeks to adjust is that revealed in the allowance 
market under the EU ETS, and that the CBAM will be implemented through an 
amendment to the EU ETS Directive. Even if the CBAM is operationalised through an 
independent act, however, such as a newly introduced customs duty or tax on imports, 
the design considerations for an IAM outlined below will apply mutatis mutandis. Only 
if the EU ETS is altogether replaced with, for instance, a new carbon tax on both 
domestic and imported products, certain aspects – such as the methodology for 
determination of carbon intensity – may have to be elaborated separately. 
Formal operationalisation of an IAM could, thus, be most easily achieved by including 
a relevant provision in the legislative text establishing the CBAM. While technical 
details could be set out in delegated acts adopted by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 290 TFEU, the cornerstones of the IAM should be set out at the same level as 
the CBAM and in sufficiently determinate language to adhere with the principles of 
legality and legal certainty that flow from the commitment to the rule of law in Article 
2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). At a minimum, this would necessitate a 
clear indication that importers have the voluntary option to request an individual 
adjustment, the main conditions for doing so, and the fallback to a default carbon 
intensity if the option is not exercised or its conditions are not met. Procedurally, an 
amendment of the EU ETS Directive would occur through co-decision and with 
qualified majority voting as set out in Article 294 TFEU. Text Box 3 below illustrates 
how such a provision could be worded. 
4.2 Functional considerations 
Functionally, the IAM provision would enable importers to avoid the compliance 
obligation that otherwise results from application of the default carbon intensity 
values specified for different products under the CBAM. Such default carbon 
intensities can be set at very different levels, ranging from the assumption that foreign 
producers are highly carbon intensive and emit as if they had implemented the “worst 
available technology” to a sectoral average carbon intensity in a particular geographic 
                                               
26 Without ruling out additional design options, the Commission has indicated that it is evaluating three 
different types of policy instrument: a carbon tax on certain imported and domestic products, a new 
carbon customs duty or tax on imports, or the extension of the EU ETS to imports (European 
Commission 2020). 
27 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing 
a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L275/32, 25 October 2003 (as amended). 
15 
 
context, all the way to different “best available technology” or “best performer” 
benchmarks.28 Given the need to ensure equal treatment of “like” domestic and 
imported products under Article III of the GATT and the prohibition of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination under the “chapeau” of Article XX, the default carbon 
intensity applied to imports should be at least as favourable as the average carbon 
intensity of European producers.29 Which default intensity is ultimately chosen has no 
bearing on the design and expedience of an IAM, however.  
In a CBAM implemented through extension of the EU ETS – the variant we assume 
here – importers of covered products who do not avail themselves of the IAM would 
be required to purchase and surrender allowances30 for the amount of emissions 
corresponding to the weight of imported product multiplied by the default carbon 
intensity applied to imports.31 Importers whose actual carbon intensity is lower than 
the default intensity of European producers, however, could reduce their compliance 
obligation by voluntarily triggering the IAM. 
To do so, importers would have to furnish reliable information documenting the actual 
emissions associated with production. An important question, thus, relates to the 
methodologies and process used to determine and report the carbon intensity of 
imported products under an IAM. Ideally, the rules applicable to imports should 
follow the same modalities used for domestic products  to minimise differentiation. 
Domestic producers whose installations are covered by the EU ETS are required to 
comply with an elaborate compliance cycle setting out an annual procedure of 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) based on detailed rules, principles, and 
guidance documents (see below, Box 2). 
Box 2: The compliance cycle in the EU ETS 
Under the EU ETS, covered installations measure and report emissions in accordance with a 
delegated act of the Commission, the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation (MRR),32 and a series 
of supporting guidance documents. For each installation covered by the EU ETS, operators are 
initially required to submit a monitoring plan that sets out the methodologies used to calculate 
                                               
28 An example of such a “best performer“ benchmark are the product benchmarks used for purposes of 
free allocation to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries under the EU ETS, representing the 
average carbon intensity of the 10% most efficient installations in terms of metric tons of CO2 emitted 
per ton of product produced during a specified period. 
29 Relying on the average carbon intensity of European producers is also the approach proposed in the 
French Non-Paper of 2016 (France 2016). 
30 Such allowances would likely be different from the EU ETS allowances (EUAs) auctioned or allocated 
in the primary market of the EU ETS, and be neither fungible with EUAs, nor have any effect on the 
emissions cap of the EU ETS. They could be “virtual” allowances purely issued for purposes of the 
CBAM, sold to importers at a price that reflects the average price of EUAs over a specified period, or 
the closing price at the previous day. For purposes of outlining the IAM, these details are not relevant.  
31 To the extent that domestic producers still benefit from free allocation of allowances, the compliance 
obligation would need to be adjusted – to ensure equal treatment – so as to reflect the difference between 
the average carbon intensity and the more efficient benchmark used to calculate free allocation for 
relevant domestic products. 
32 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 of 19 December 2018 on the Monitoring and 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament 




emissions.33 Operators have some discretion to choose between alternative monitoring 
methodologies, such as calculation- and measurement-based methodologies or combinations 
thereof. Still, based on the annual emissions of each installation, different accuracy requirements – 
or “tiers” – apply; installations that exceed specified emission thresholds are required to achieve a 
higher level of accuracy. If producers can demonstrate that observance of a tier incurs unreasonable 
costs, however, the competent authority can allow a less accurate monitoring approach.  
Once the monitoring plan is approved by the competent national authority, operators are required 
to compile emissions in an annual emission report, applying the methodology contained in the 
monitoring plan. Relevant information in the report includes annual activity data, such as fuel 
input and raw material throughput data; calculation values, such as net calorific heat values and 
emission, conversion, and oxidation factors; and laboratory analyses and sampling results. Prior to 
submission, annual emission reports have to be audited – often including a site visit – by an 
independent verifier accredited pursuant to the Accreditation and Verification Regulation (AVR).34 
Accreditation requires periodic attestation by a national accreditation body that a verifier meets 
the requirements set by harmonised verification standards, such as ISO 14065, and is subject to 
ongoing surveillance. After submission of the verified report, the competent national authority can 
perform spot checks and inspections, and - if it detects misstatements or non-conformities – take 
different facilitative and enforcement measures. 
Under the IAM proposed with the French Non-Paper of 2016, foreign producers would 
have been able to document their actual emissions through submission of an 
“emissions certificate”, which “could take the form of a reporting of direct emissions 
per ton of product” with a level of stringency “in the methodology for monitoring, 
reporting and verification” of manufacturing plant emissions “comparable to that of 
the EU ETS” (France 2016). In essence, the IAM would require importers of covered 
products to comply with the same monitoring and reporting provisions as European 
producers. Importers deciding to exercise the IAM would have to furnish a monitoring 
plan for each installation35 in which imported products covered by the CBAM are 
manufactured, and annually follow up with an emissions certificate applying the same 
calculation methods, with tiered accuracy requirements, as their EU counterparts. 
Consistent with the compliance cycle applicable to the EU producers, importers would 
also be required to obtain independent verification by an accredited verifier as a means 
of ensuring the integrity of reported data (see also below, Section 4.3). 
4.3 Specific challenges 
Generally, the legal imperative to avoid discrimination between domestic and 
imported products favours applying the same rules and procedures to importers 
invoking the IAM. In some matters, however, differentiation may be justified, for 
instance to avoid undue cost and hardship, or to support the environmental objectives 
of the CBAM. One such matter relates to the verifiers that are eligible to perform the 
independent verification of emission certificates compiled by importers. In its 
                                               
33 Approval of the plan is not a discretionary decision, but has to be given if the monitoring plan meets 
the requirements of the MRR, including its principles of completeness, consistency, comparability, 
accuracy, and integrity of monitoring and reporting. 
34 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 of 19 December 2018 on the Verification of 
Data and on the Accreditation of Verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 334/94, 31 December 2018. 
35 In practice, where the importer differs from the operator of the production facilities, the installation 
operators would perform the required monitoring and reporting activities, but responsibility for their 
timely provision, accuracy and so on could rest with the importer to streamline and simplify the process. 
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proposed rulemaking to define individual baselines for the U.S. reformulated gasoline 
program, the EPA would have required the verification process to be carried out by 
entities accredited in the United States (see above, Box 1).  
Similarly limiting eligible verifiers to those located and accredited in the EU could 
impose an undue cost on importers, however: as the French Non-Paper rightly 
observed, the audit cost to importers should be comparable to the cost borne by 
European producers in order to avoid discrimination (France 2016). Under the EU ETS, 
verifiers are entities certified by the national accreditation bodies of each Member 
State. Hence, it appears reasonable to allow verification by entities accredited in the 
country from which imported products originate, provided the accreditation 
conditions are comparable in stringency.  
Because national accreditation bodies in the EU apply harmonised standards such as 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) norm ISO 14065, which specifies 
principles and requirements for bodies that undertake validation or verification of 
greenhouse gas assertions, such a requirement of comparability in accreditation 
conditions should not result in undue cost or hardship for importers. Questions related 
to the recognition of foreign verifiers – and also, for instance, specifying the 
equivalence of laboratory analyses performed outside the EU – could be specified in a 
delegated act of the Commission that details technical and procedural aspects related 
to emission certificates. 
A similar departure from the rules applicable to domestic producers could be justified 
when it comes to the point of regulation. In the EU, stationary emitters are regulated 
at the level of individual installations, defined by Article 3(e) of the EU ETS Directive 
as technical units where one or more covered activities are carried out. Installations 
operated by the same company at different sites are, thus, regulated separately, each 
reporting emissions and complying with EU ETS obligations independently. 
Determination of carbon intensity at the installation level for the purposes of an IAM 
can raise concerns about reshuffling between different installations owned by the same 
company, as described above in Section 2.3.  
Since such reshuffling can jeopardise the environmental objectives of the CBAM – and 
thus also its justification under Article XX of the GATT – it could be justifiable to set 
the point of regulation for importers at the company level, meaning that an importer 
would have to comply with the CBAM based on the average carbon intensity of all 
production facilities operated by the same producer in non-EU countries. Importers 
would then no longer be able to lower their compliance burden by focusing abatement 
efforts on select installations designated for production for the EU market. Still, such 
an approach would require further study, for instance on the additional administrative 
burden and economic cost it would impose on foreign producers by requiring MRV of 
emissions for multiple installations.36  
Also, alternative definitions of “company” and their respective implications would 
need to be evaluated, especially with regard to large corporations with complex, 
                                               
36 It is worth noting, however, that domestic producers covered by the EU ETS will also often operate 
multiple installations that fall within the scope of activity thresholds under the EU ETS Directive and 
each necessitate individual monitoring and reporting; as such, at a company level, formal treatment 
would again be symmetrical, even if the number of installations may differ on a case by case basis. 
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vertically and horizontally layered decision-making structures, as well as state-owned 
enterprises where centralised decisions can affect several companies at once and are 
often reached on political grounds. One option for the EU to disincentivise resource 
shuffling could also be to retain some degree of discretion with regard to the IAM, and 
reserve the option of returning to a default carbon intensity for imported products if 
there are objective factors suggesting that the importer may be engaged in resource 
shuffling practices. At worst, thus, importers would fall back to the default intensity, 
which, if set at the average carbon intensity of EU producers or better, should not 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 
Finally, the process through which importers submit the emissions certificate should 
be as straightforward as possible and aligned with existing processes to the extent 
possible. On this point, the French BCA Non-Paper of 2016 offers a template for 
integration of the emissions certificate with the existing customs process, allowing its 
submission as part of the Single Administrative Document (SAD) used as the 
harmonised customs declaration across Member States when products enter the EU 
market (France 2016). Already, the customs declarations filed with each import contain 
some of the requisite data needed to operationalise the IAM, including the quantity of 
imported product and the importer, identified by the unique EORI (Economic 
Operator Registration and Identification) number issued to entities engaged in 
customs activities.  
Such data collected by the customs authorities would enable precise and automatic 
determination of the number of allowances to be surrendered by each importer, based 
on import volumes multiplied either by the default carbon intensity applied to that 
product or, where an emissions certificate has been submitted through the IAM, the 
specific emissions associated with the imported product. Because all products covered 
by the CBAM would bear a customs tariff nomenclature reference corresponding to an 
EU ETS product code, production and emissions data as well as the average share of 
free allocation for the corresponding domestic products would be readily available. 
Ultimately, so the French Non-Paper, this would ensure equal treatment of “like” 
domestic and imported products (France, 2016).  
Box 3: Legislative language to operationalise an IAM 
When amending the EU ETS Directive to include one or more provisions setting out the CBAM, 
the EU legislator could include a passage operationalising the IAM as a voluntary option for 
importers. Although the exact wording and terminology would have to be aligned with that 
employed for the CBAM,37 in its simplest form the text setting up an IAM could read as follows: 
“1. For purposes of compliance with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, any importer of a covered 
product may request determination of its obligation to acquire and surrender allowances for imported 
products on the basis of the individual greenhouse gas emissions intensity of that product, provided that: 
(a) the importer has submitted an application to the [authority responsible for implementation of the 
CBAM] containing the information listed in Article 5 (a) to (d) for the installation from which the imported 
                                               
37 Note that this wording assumes the IAM will operate at the level of the individual installation 
producing the imported product, instead of relying on the average emissions of all relevant installations 
operated by the same company as a way of addressing reshuffling concerns. If the latter approach is 
favoured, additional language would be needed to specify the exact boundaries of the IAM and the 
scope of monitoring and reporting it requires from importers. 
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product originates, including a description of measures planned to monitor and report emissions in 
accordance with the guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 14; 
(b) the importer reports to the [authority responsible for implementation of the CBAM] the emissions 
from that installation  during each calendar year after the end of that year in accordance with the guidelines; 
(c) the importer ensures that the report submitted pursuant to paragraph 1(b) is verified in accordance with 
the criteria set out in Annex V by a verifier accredited in any Member State or in the country of origin of the 
imported product, as specified in the delegated act mentioned in paragraph 4. 
2. The [authority responsible for implementation of the CBAM] grants the request for individual 
determination mentioned in paragraph 1 if the conditions in paragraph 1(a) to (c) are met. It can deny the 
request, or revoke it if previously granted, if there is credible indication that the importer is engaged in 
practices aimed at minimising its compliance obligation under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
by means other than emissions abatement or a reduction of imports. Any importer affected by such denial or 
revocation can appeal the decision of the [authority responsible for implementation of the CBAM] 
through the process specified in the delegated act adopted pursuant to paragraph 4. 
3. Upon entry into the customs territory of the Union, the importer seeking individual adjustment pursuant 
to paragraph 1 shall submit an emissions certificate documenting the verified individual greenhouse gas 
emissions intensity of the imported product, expressed in terms of emissions of covered greenhouse gases 
generated per ton of product, with the single administrative document accompanying the imported product 
pursuant to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/341 of 17 December 2015. 
4. The Commission shall adopt a delegated act by [date] specifying the detailed requirements for adjustment 
on the basis of individual greenhouse gas emissions intensity of imported products, including further 
guidance on monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions, eligibility of verifiers, oversight by the 
[authority responsible for implementation of the CBAM], and the appeals process mentioned in 
paragraph 2. 
4.4 Case study: applying the IAM in the steel sector 
To visualise how operation of the IAM could look in practice, this section traces the 
steps described above in general terms as they would be implemented in a real-world 
setting for an importer of steel manufactured outside the EU. The steel sector is an 
example of an industry in which there is significant variation in carbon intensities even 
among the largest players (CDP 2019). For this case study, we consider a (hypothetical) 
importer seeking to introduce into the EU a quantity qijk of steel i originating from steel 
mill j located in country k outside the EU. Steel mill j uses a blast furnace process to 
produce crude steel. 
We suppose that the EU has enacted the CBAM as an extension of the EU ETS to 
imports, the CBAM is in force, country k falls within the geographic scope of the 
CBAM, and steel is one of the products it covers. The closing price of EU allowances 
on the day prior to importation is t, and we here assume that foreign steel producers 
in country k do not face an explicit carbon price (tijk = 0). The EU’s CBAM applies a 
default carbon intensity Zi that is set at the level of the average carbon intensity of EU 
producers yi, and that the actual carbon intensity of the foreign steel is zijk, which is 
reflected in the IAM.38 
                                               
38 For the sake of simplicity, we apply in the following one aggregate carbon intensity for the various 
process steps (coking, sintering and hot metal production) at steel mill j, assume that the steel mill does 
not further process the steel it produces, and do not consider indirect emissions from imported heat or 
electricity, nor the role of waste gas. For a more accurate breakdown of the individual steps in 
steelmaking that fall under assigned benchmarks under the EU ETS, see European Commission 2019b. 
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We compare the compliance burden under a default-only CBAM with that arising 
under an IAM under two scenarios on free allocation. In the first, domestic EU steel 
producers are allocated, on average, free allowances to cover 80% of their emissions; 
in the second, free allocation is discontinued with the introduction of a border 
adjustment. We use hypothetical but plausible figures for these variables,39 as 
summarized in the following table: 
 
Variables Description and value 
qijk Quantity of 100,000 tonnes of crude steel 
t  EU carbon price 25 €/tonne CO2 
yi Average EU carbon intensity of 2.1 tonnes CO2/tonne steel  
fi Average share of free allocation in the EU of 80% 
Zi  CBAM default carbon intensity of 2.1 tonnes CO2/tonne steel 
zijk Actual producer carbon intensity of 1.9 tonnes CO2/tonne steel 
Table 1. Summary of variables used for case study on steel 
We can thus calculate the compliance burden faced by the importer, using the 
formulae derived in Section 2.4. First, under the CBAM based only on a default 
intensity, upon entry into the customs territory of the EU, and without furnishing an 
individual emissions certificate as part of the customs forms compiled in the SAD, j 
would face a compliance obligation, expressed here in monetary terms,40 as follows: 
Payment = qijk x t x Zi x (1 – fi) = 100,000 x 25 €/tCO2 x 2.1 tCO2 x 20% = 1,050,000 €. 
If, instead, the EU CBAM includes, as a voluntary option, an IAM for covered 
products, and importer j chooses to avail itself of this option, the calculation becomes: 
Payment = qijk x t x [min{zijk,Zi} – fi x yi]  
     = 100,000 x 25 €/tCO2 x [1.9 tCO2 – 80% x 2.1 tCO2 ] = 550,000 €.  
The ability to exercise the voluntary IAM here decreases the payment obligation for 
importer j by almost 50%, reflecting that it is cleaner than the default carbon intensity. 
Similarly, we can compute the compliance burdens for the scenario in which free 
allocation in the EU is discontinued (so instead fi = 0). Under the default-only CBAM, 
this leads to payment that is five times as large at 5,250,000 €. With the voluntary IAM, 
                                               
39 Our assumed carbon intensities are loosely based on the data in Material Economics (2019) and the 
benchmarks contained in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331 of 19 December 2018 
Determining Transitional Union-wide Rules for Harmonised Free Allocation of Emission Allowances 
pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 
59/8, 27 February 2019. 
40 Since, in our example, we assume that the CBAM is implemented through extension of the EU ETS to 
imports, this compliance obligation would more likely be calculated on the basis of an obligation to 
purchase a specified quantity of allowances, factoring in free allocation to domestic producers (and any 
carbon price imposed on the imported product in the country of origin). 
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the payment increases by the same amount in absolute terms to 4,750,000 €. The 
reduction in compliance burden due to the IAM is now around 10%. 
This example underscores the risk of a CBAM implemented without an IAM being 
seen as imposing an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, in line with the case law 
presented in Section 3. As a condition for the reduced compliance burden, however, 
importer j will have been required to first submit an application as well as an emissions 
certificate setting out the emissions during the previous calendar year in line with 
provisions of the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and relevant guidance 
documents.41 Additionally, that certificate will have required verification by an 
independent verification body, which—if the CBAM is operationalized as suggested 
in Section 4.2—could be an auditor accredited by a national accreditation body in 
country k attesting that it meets the conditions of a relevant norm such as ISO 14065.  
5. Concluding remarks 
As noted by Helm, Hepburn & Ruta (2012), opposition to border carbon adjustments 
due to concerns about implementation costs is to see “the perfect as the enemy of the 
good”. In this paper, we have explored how far the good can be pushed in terms of 
policy design for a CBAM on imports. We have proposed a CBAM design with a 
voluntary individual adjustment that allows producers to demonstrate that their actual 
carbon intensity lies below a default value. Relative to a CBAM based solely on the 
default value, an IAM captures additional economic benefits of carbon pricing—
notably rewarding producers’ decarbonization efforts—and improves the overall legal 
prospects of a CBAM being found to comply with international law and WTO rules. 
We outlined practical considerations around the implementation of an IAM drawing 
on the EU ETS’s existing architecture for emissions verification.  
Another consideration is the ability of a CBAM to raise additional EU fiscal revenue. 
The European Commission has already revealed its likely importance by noting, in a 
discussion of the recovery from Covid-19 and its reinforced financial framework for 
2021–2027, that “a carbon border adjustment mechanism could bring additional 
revenues ranging from about €5 billion to €14 billion, depending on the scope and 
design” (European Commission 2020b). Reliance on a CBAM design based solely on 
default intensity arguably has the benefit of bringing relatively greater certainty about 
the likely size of the tax take. Use of an IAM would lead to an additional layer of 
budgetary uncertainty—but, as shown in this paper, also offers significant economic 
and environmental benefits. The latter, in particular, will also play a significant role in 
determining the legal prospects of a future CBAM. 
  
                                               
41 Section 5 in Annex IV of the MRR details the MRV requirements for pig iron and steel. In the case of 
steel produced through EAF, direct CO2 emissions will result from fuel and carbon from electrodes and 
scrap that is oxidised in the furnace. Because the EAF in our example is powered entirely by renewable 
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